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INCARCERATED AND UNREPRESENTED: PRISON-BASED
GERRYMANDERING AND WHY EVENWEL’S APPROVAL OF
“TOTAL POPULATION” AS A POPULATION BASE SHOULDN’T
INCLUDE INCARCERATED POPULATIONS
Emily J. Heltzel*
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, in a small town in Jones County, Iowa, called Anamosa, Danny R.
Young was elected to the Anamosa City Council after garnering a grand total of two
votes: write-in votes from his wife and a neighbor.1 Mr. Young’s ward, Ward 2, pur-
portedly had a population approximately equivalent to the populations of the other
wards in his town: somewhere around 1,400 people.2 However, because the United
States Census Bureau counts incarcerated individuals as residents of their location
of incarceration, included in that 1,400 population figure for Ward 2 were about
1,300 inmates who were incarcerated in a prison located within Mr. Young’s ward.3
Although these 1,300 inmates could not vote in Ward 2 and would not, in any mean-
ingful way, be represented by Mr. Young, their presence was nevertheless included
when calculating the ward’s population and drawing the district lines that created
the wards.4 Accordingly, while the census numbers suggested a total population of
approximately 1,400, the reality was that Mr. Young was effectively elected—by his
wife and neighbor—to represent only fifty-eight people: the non-incarcerated cit-
izens of Ward 2.5 As a result, Mr. Young’s fifty-eight constituents enjoyed approx-
imately twenty-five times more “political clout” than the residents of Anamosa’s
other wards, whose representatives had the needs of all 1,400 constituents to address.6
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topic. I am forever indebted to my parents, David and Judy Heltzel, and my incomparable
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1 Sam Roberts, Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners Benefits Some Rural Voting
Districts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/politics/24cen
sus.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See id.
533
534 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:533
As a further, unintended result, Anamosa became a national symbol for the issue of
prison-based gerrymandering.7
Based on the principle of “one-person, one-vote,” first espoused by the United
States Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders,8 jurisdictions are required to design
their legislative districts with equal populations.9 To do this, most jurisdictions rely
on population data from the U.S. Census Bureau.10 Because the Census Bureau counts
prison inmates as residents of the districts where they are incarcerated, voting-eligible
residents of legislative districts with correctional facilities tend to be over-represented
in terms of voting power.11 This practice—using prison populations to dilute the votes
of residents in other districts—is referred to as “prison-based gerrymandering.”12 Al-
though states are not required to use the Census Bureau data, most do.13
This Note is divided into four Parts. Part I examines the problem of prison-based
gerrymandering, focusing on the impact of the Census Bureau’s method for counting
incarcerated populations in the decennial census and the possibility of state-level solu-
tions to the problem.14 Part II explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Evenwel
v. Abbott,15 which upheld the use of total population as an apportionment base.16
More specifically, Part II examines the potential implications of the Evenwel deci-
sion on lower courts by analyzing two district court rulings, Calvin v. Jefferson County
7 Id. For a discussion of the Anamosa situation, as well as a comprehensive survey of the
effect that prison-based gerrymandering has on local and state governments throughout the
country, see The Problem, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html [https://perma.cc/RH3X-MV5J] (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2017).
8 376 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, Counting Matters: Prison
Inmates, Population Bases, and “One Person, One Vote,” 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 229,
229 n.2 (2004).
9 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–9.
10 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2017). See generally Proposed 2020 Cen-
sus Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 81 Fed. Reg. 42577 (proposed June 30, 2016)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria] (explaining
how the census is conducted).
11 See Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra note 8, at 230.
12 Ben Peck, Senior Legislative & Policy Assoc., Dçmos, Testimony Before the National
Advisory Committee on Racial, Ethnic and Other Populations of the U.S. Census Bureau:
The Census Count and Prisoners: The Problem, the Solutions and What the Census Can Do
(Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/BenPeck_Testimony
_PrisonBasedGerrymandering101212.pdf [https://perma.cc/33R7-C8CH].
13 See Brenda Wright & Peter Wagner, States Are Authorized to Adjust Census Data to End
Prison-Based Gerrymandering, and Many Already Do, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE & DÇMOS,
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/factsheets/adjusting.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G9Z-UQKS]
(last updated Sept. 22, 2010).
14 See infra Part I.
15 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
16 Id. at 1123; see infra Part II.
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Board of Commissioners17 and Davidson v. City of Cranston,18 that invalidated
redistricting plans in Florida and Rhode Island, respectively, because of the plans’
utilization of prison-based gerrymandering.19
Part III argues that the Supreme Court in Evenwel deliberately crafted its hold-
ing in terms of representational equality, noticeably—and purposefully—leaving
open the question of who is being represented.20 Accordingly, the decision in Evenwel
did not mandate reversal of the district courts’ decisions in Calvin and Davidson, be-
cause the Evenwel Court’s representational theory does not stretch far enough to in-
clude incarcerated populations. Finally, the Conclusion states that in a challenge to
a ruling similar to the First Circuit’s reversal of the District Court of Rhode Island’s
decision in Davidson,21 the Supreme Court can further expand on and solidify the
representational theory it relied on in Evenwel by holding that the approved “total
population” apportionment base refers to the total represented population, which
definitively does not include incarcerated populations.22
I. BACKGROUND
Voters are often grouped into districts for the purpose of electing many democratic
representatives—ranging from county and municipal officials to state legislators and
members of Congress.23 These districts have been called the “building blocks . . . of
our representative democracy.”24 Jurisdictions are required to design their legislative
districts with roughly equal populations.25 Although precise mathematic equality is not
required, the Supreme Court has established an “as nearly as practicable” standard.26
Established in Wesberry v. Sanders27 and clarified in subsequent cases,28 this standard
17 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
18 188 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
19 Both district courts found that the inclusion of prison populations unconstitutionally
diluted the voting strength of others. See Davidson, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 152; Calvin, 172 F.
Supp. 3d at 1323–26.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
22 See infra Conclusion.
23 See 7 Things to Know About Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 28, 2013),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/7-things-know-about-redistricting [https://perma.cc
/KPU6-QE7G] [hereinafter 7 Things].
24 Erika L. Wood, One Significant Step: How Reforms to Prison Districts Begin to Ad-
dress Political Inequality, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 179, 209 (2015).
25 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18
(1964).
26 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8.
27 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
28 See, e.g., Graham v. Thornburgh, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding
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requires that states make a “good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality” in dividing their districts.29 After a careful examination of the history be-
hind the enactment of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Court concluded
in Wesberry that “[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.”30 The Supreme Court then observed that James Madison’s comments on
the subject in The Federalist (“Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more
than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the hum-
ble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body
of the people of the United States.”) could fairly be interpreted as meaning “one-
person, one-vote.”31 While the Court’s decision in Wesberry addressed the selection
of members of the federal House of Representatives, the Court subsequently noted
in Reynolds v. Sims32 that Wesberry definitively established that the fundamental
principle of representative government is “one of equal representation for equal num-
bers of people, without regard to race, sex, [or] economic status . . . .”33 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the one-person, one-vote principle from Wesberry was prop-
erly encompassed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
In order to maintain the constitutionally mandated standard of roughly equal
populations in each district, jurisdictions must periodically redraw their district lines.35
This is done through a process known as redistricting.36 The specific interests that an
elected official of a given district will represent are dictated by how the district lines are
drawn, because these district lines define the community to be represented.37 The
that the “as nearly as practicable” standard required a “good-faith effort”); Adams v. Clinton,
90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2000) (distinguishing between Wesberry and Reynolds).
29 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577).
30 376 U.S. at 17.
31 See id. at 18 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 385 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
32 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33 Id. at 560–61.
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560–61.
35 See, e.g., 7 Things, supra note 23.
36 Although sometimes used interchangeably to more easily facilitate discussion, see,
e.g., Stephanie Cirkovich, Note, Abandoning the Ten Percent Rule and Reclaiming One
Person, One Vote, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1823, 1824 n.9 (2010), the terms “reapportionment,”
“redistricting,” and “gerrymandering” have three distinct definitions. See JUSTIN LEVITT,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 6–7 (2010), http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/2008redistrictingGuide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DC9W-PG4L]. “Reapportionment” is the process of deciding, based on population,
how many representatives a particular state or district receives. Id. “Redistricting” is the pro-
cess of redrawing legislative district lines. Id. “Gerrymandering” is the process of redrawing
district lines for the purpose of increasing a group’s political power. Id.
37 Wood, supra note 24, at 209.
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concept of “one-person, one-vote” is often at the center of litigation surrounding
redistricting plans,38 and litigation tends to track the decennial census.39 Redistricting
plans must comport with the idea that, under the Constitution, each citizen has the right
to have her vote counted equally.40 Challenges to redistricting plans tend to focus on
vote dilution—the diminution of group voting power.41 As Stanford Professor Pamela
Karlan has observed, “genuinely meaningful political participation implicates groups
of voters, rather than only atomistic individuals.”42 Stated otherwise, the concept of
“representation” applies to groups, rather than individual voters, because it is groups
of voters—not each individual voter—who ultimately elect representatives.43 Thus, the
one-person, one-vote challenges to redistricting plans are driven by the contention that
because of the way the new districts have been drawn, certain groups of people are
denied their right to “democratic representation in proportion to their numbers.”44
As noted above, only “a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality”
of district populations—and not precise mathematical equality itself—is required in
redistricting.45 The Supreme Court has provided a rule of thumb (the “ten percent rule”)
for what constitutes a “minor” deviation from mathematical equality of populations.46
As the Court explained in Brown v. Thomson, minor deviations are considered insuffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment: “[A]s a general matter, . . . an apportionment plan with a maximum
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations. A plan
38 See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 379–81 (2011).
39 Nathanial Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to
Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 756 (2011) (“[T]he con-
troversies surrounding the census have remained linked to the unique place of the census in
the constitutional design.”).
40 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1964). The Court’s earlier decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), paved the
way for these decisions, holding that redistricting cases present justiciable issues and thus
“dispos[e] of the political-question barrier to justiciability of legislative apportionment
challenges.” John C. Drake, Note, Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to Prison-
Based Gerrymandering, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 237, 242 n.35 (2011).
41 Wood, supra note 24, at 207 (“[V]ote dilution is about the interests of groups coming
together to elect a representative of choice.”); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (observing that “[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of
voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot”).
42 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the De-
bate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (2004).
43 Id. (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
44 Wood, supra note 24, at 208.
45 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
577); see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
46 See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983).
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with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion and therefore must be justified by the State.”47
A crucial interplay exists between the principle of one-person, one-vote and the
redistricting process: depending on how district lines are drawn and how voters are
grouped within districts, “the district lines can make it much easier or much harder to
elect any given representative, or to elect a representative responsive to any given
community.”48 Left unchecked, the redistricting process provides a tempting oppor-
tunity for legislators to manipulate the voting power of individuals and groups in a
given district.49
A. The Increased Impact of the United States Census Bureau’s “Usual Residence”
Rule in the Era of Mass Incarceration
In pursuit of its fundamental goal of counting “each person living in the country
once, only once, and in the correct place,”50 the U.S. Census Bureau counts people at
their “usual residence,” a concept established in the Census Act of 1790 that has been
followed in all subsequent censuses.51 The Census Bureau defines “usual residence” as
“the place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time,” which it acknowledges
does not necessarily coincide with the person’s legal residence or voting residence.52
Perhaps unsurprisingly, “nonhousehold populations”—populations of group quarter
facilities such as college and university dormitories, military bases with on-base hous-
ing, and jails and prisons—present unique cases of “residential ambiguity.”53 After
wrestling with how to handle the issue of incarcerated populations, the Census Bureau
ultimately decided to count incarcerated individuals’ “usual residence” as their location
of incarceration.54 After all, in line with the Census Bureau’s chosen internal definition
for “usual residence,” prisoners admittedly do “generally eat, sleep and work in their
place of confinement.”55
47 Id. (internal citations omitted).
48 LEVITT, supra note 36, at 10.
49 See id.
50 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ONCE, ONLY ONCE, AND IN THE RIGHT PLACE: RESIDENCE
RULES IN THE DECENNIAL CENSUS 1 (Daniel L. Cork & Paul R. Voss eds., 2006).
51 Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 101, 103 (stating that rules for ascertaining a
person’s residence for enumeration purposes would be based on the concept of “usual place
of abode”: “[E]very person occasionally absent at the time of the enumeration [will be
enumerated] as belonging to that place in which he usually resides in the United States.”);
see, e.g., Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
52 Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
53 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 62–63.
54 See Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
55 See Persily, supra note 39, at 786.
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Federal law does not require states to use the exact population data gathered by
the Census Bureau.56 The Supreme Court has confirmed this, noting that “[t]he deci-
sion to include or exclude [groups such as short-term or temporary residents] in-
volves choices about the nature of representation with which we have been shown
no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.”57 Nevertheless, although states are not
required to use the Census Bureau’s population data when they draw their districts,
most do.58 Because most states use the census figures when drawing their districts,
the resulting total population figures used as the apportionment base in districting
plans are inflated in districts that house correctional facilities.59 The result is that non-
incarcerated residents of legislative districts that happen to have correctional facil-
ities are over-represented in terms of both voting and representational power.60 As
one critic has noted, “[t]his bogus inflation gives prison districts undeserved strength
in the state legislature and more influence than they would otherwise have in state
affairs.”61 Consider the case of Cranston, Rhode Island, the town whose redistricting
plan is at issue in Davidson v. City of Cranston.62 In a hotly contested race for state
House Speaker (considered “arguably the most powerful political position in Rhode
Island”),63 the Democratic incumbent Nicholas Mattiello and his challenger Steven
56 See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 331–32 (1973) (rejecting Virginia’s assertion that
the lower courts erred in “declining to accord conclusive weight to the legislative reliance on cen-
sus figures” and finding that the district court was justified in disallowing a legislative plan that
resulted in “significant population disparities and the assignment of military personnel to vote
in districts [where] they admittedly did not reside”); see also Wright & Wagner, supra note 13.
57 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). It is worth noting that at least one
state has concluded that its own state law mandates the use of the Census Bureau count. See
STANLEY ROSENBERG & MICHAEL J. MORAN, MASS. GEN. COURT, REPORT FROM THE
CHAIRS OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING 15–17 (2012), http://archives
.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/213880/ocn889628904.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVA9
-24U6]. The fact nevertheless remains that the Supreme Court has determined that there is
no federal constitutional mandate that requires the use of the Census Bureau figures.
58 See 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2017); Proposed 2020 Census Res-
idence Criteria, supra note 10; Wright & Wagner, supra note 13.
59 Drake, supra note 40, at 249–50 (observing that “[t]he policy of counting prisoners
as residents of the communities in which they are imprisoned has profound consequences .
. . result[ing] in population data about communities—both the prison communities and the com-
munities of origin—that, while relied on by policy makers, does not accurately reflect the needs
of those communities”). Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to recognize
not only the resulting inflation of population figures in districts that house correctional facilities,
but also the deflation of the population figures—and thus, the decrease of the corresponding rep-
resentational power—in the inmates’ respective communities of origin.
60 See Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra note 8, at 230.
61 Editorial, Phantom Constituents in the Census, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/09/26/opinion/phantom-constituents-in-the-census.html [hereinafter
Phantom Constituents].
62 See 188 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), discussed infra Section II.B.
63 Kim Kalunian, Non-Voting Inmates Count as Constituents for Mattiello, Frias, WPRI.COM
(Nov. 5, 2016, 12:34 PM), http://wpri.com/2016/11/05/non-voting-inmates-count-as-constit
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Frias could narrow their focus to a smaller pool of voters, since many of their “con-
stituents” were actually inmates of the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI).64 Tell-
ing of the lack of representation for the incarcerated inmates, when Mr. Frias was
asked about the topic, “he [did not] have a comment on the topic, [stating that he was]
‘focused on the residents that can vote in [the] district.’”65
Prison-based gerrymandering, generally speaking, refers to the practice of spe-
cifically using the presence of incarcerated populations to dilute the votes of res-
idents in other districts.66 As it has been put more bluntly, communities engaged in
prison-based gerrymandering “increase their political clout on the backs of their
prison populations.”67 Without the boost from including incarcerated populations in
their numbers, many of these districts would fall far short of meeting minimum pop-
ulation requirements, which would mandate that the district lines be redrawn.68 Prior
to New York’s enactment of a law ending the state’s practice of prison-based gerry-
mandering,69 for example, the population base for a city council district in Rome,
New York, was comprised of about fifty percent inmates of correctional facilities.70
Approximately thirty percent of upstate New York’s “population growth” during the
1990s was actually attributable to the presence of correctional facilities.71 Strikingly,
although New York City counts as the “home of residence” for sixty-six percent of
all prisoners incarcerated in the state of New York, ninety-one percent of these pris-
oners are incarcerated outside of New York City.72
For an even more illustrative example, consider Jefferson County, a county in
northern Florida.73 Jefferson County is governed by a “Board of County Commis-
sioners . . . whose five members are each elected from a single-member district.”74 The
uents-for-mattiello-frias/ [https://perma.cc/X2WJ-G8J2].
64 Id.; see also Aleks Kajstura, Rhode Island Candidates Race to Represent Phantom Con-
stituents, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2016), https://
www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2016/11/07/mattiello-frias/ [https://perma.cc/R2P5-QYDN].
65 Kalunian, supra note 63.
66 See, e.g., Prison-Based Gerrymandering Reform, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND,
http://www.naacpldf.org/case/prison-based-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/U9GG-HDR5]
(last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
67 See Drake, supra note 40, at 238. In similarly unforgiving language, prison-based gerry-
mandering has also been called “an unacceptable stain on American democracy.” See Peter
Wagner, Delaware House Passes Bill to Count Incarcerated People at Home, PRISON POL’Y INI-
TIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT (June 2, 2010), http://www.prisonersofthecen
sus.org/news/2010/06/02/delaware-house/ [https://perma.cc/47AS-G6EM].
68 See, e.g., Editorial, An End to Prison Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/opinion/23mon3.html.
69 See infra Section I.B.
70 See An End to Prison Gerrymandering, supra note 68.
71 See Ho, supra note 38, at 362 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 89).
72 See id.
73 See Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1295 (N.D. Fla.
2016).
74 Id.
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districts were drawn using the populations received from census data.75 District 3’s
census population was 3,070: a number roughly equivalent to the populations of the
other four districts, and a four percent deviation from ideal,76 thus easily considered
a “minor deviation” for purposes of the ten percent rule.77 If the incarcerated population
of the state prison located within District 3 were properly accounted for and removed
from the total population, however, the district’s population number would drop to
1,913 and its deviation from the ideal would skyrocket to -29.69%.78 Consequently,
as a result of using the census population, the 1,913 actual residents of District 3 are
able to elect a commissioner—responsive to their specific needs—who has the same
influence as, for example, the commissioner tasked with representing all 3,073 non-
incarcerated individuals in District 4.79 District 3 thus disproportionately benefits from
having a prison population that accounts for almost forty percent of its “residents.”80
The severity of the problems resulting from the utilization of the Census Bureau’s
methodology for counting incarcerated populations is greatly exacerbated in the era
of mass incarceration.81 Thus, while it has always been problematic, the inclusion of
populations housed in correctional facilities in the total population of a given district
previously affected comparably fewer people and districts than present-day.82 In stark
contrast, the total number of incarcerated individuals at the end of 2014 was esti-
mated to be 2,306,100.83 This explosion in the incarcerated population caused the
Census Bureau’s method of counting incarcerated persons to go from being a “min-
imal blip[ ]” in redistricting data to having a major impact on districting.84
Because of its wide-reaching impact, the Census Bureau is facing growing op-
position to this counting practice.85 Of the 262 comments received in response to the
75 Id. at 1297.
76 Id.
77 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983).
78 Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1297.
79 See id.
80 Id. For a further discussion of the implications of Jefferson County’s redistricting plan,
see infra Section II.B.
81 Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 38
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1251 (2012).
82 Id. at 1242–43.
83 The total number of state and federal prisoners at the end of 2014 was estimated to be
1,561,500. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/B49G-ZGDU]. Additionally, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that the total popu-
lation of county and city jails in mid-year 2014 was 744,600. Press Release, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, The Nation’s Jails Held Fewer Inmates at Midyear 2014 Compared to Their
Peak Count in 2008 (June 11, 2015), http://oip.gov/newsroom/pressrelease/2015/oip06102015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLR5-8HS4]. Therefore, the total number of incarcerated individuals
in 2014 was estimated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to be 2,306,100.
84 See Wagner, supra note 81, at 1243.
85 See, e.g., Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10; PATRICIA ALLARD
ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: WHY THE CENSUS
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Census Bureau’s request for public comment on the 2010 Census Residence Rule and
Residence Situations, 162 pertained to the policy concerning where prisoners are
counted.86 Dr. Kenneth Prewitt, who served as the Director of the Census Bureau from
1998–2001,87 has summed up the basic argument against the current method as follows:
Current census residency rules ignore the reality of prison life. In-
carcerated people have virtually no contact with the community
surrounding the prison. Upon release the vast majority return to the
community in which they lived prior to incarceration. . . . Counting
people in prison as residents of their home communities offers a
more accurate picture of the size, demographics, and needs of our
nation’s communities, and will lead to more informed policies and
a more just distribution of public funds.88
Financially, the current system disadvantages the under-counted home communities of
incarcerated individuals by denying them their fair allocation of public funds.89 How-
ever, the financial inequities, although significant, are not the end of the problem. In a
September 2016 letter to the Census Bureau, Senators Christopher Coons and Sheldon
Whitehouse, along with eleven other senators, specifically addressed additional redis-
tricting concerns that arise from the Census Bureau’s policy, noting that “[w]hen the
Census counts individuals who are in a correctional facility on Census Day as if that
correctional facility is their home, legislative redistricting can inflate the political power
of areas around prisons with added ‘residents’ who often cannot vote while simulta-
neously disempowering the communities these individuals consider home.”90 Despite
BUREAU SHOULD CHANGE THE WAY IT COUNTS PRISONERS 1 (2004), http://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/RV3_OneSize.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPG7-368F] (advo-
cating for a change in the “usual residence” policy used by the Census Bureau because of the
fundamental differences between students and prisoners); Drake, supra note 40, at 238 (dis-
cussing the counting of incarcerated populations as residents of their prison cells as the
successor to the counting of slaves as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of legislative
reapportionment: “The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution nullified the three-fifths
clause in 1868, but many rural regions in the United States continue to leverage a captive,
disenfranchised population for political power.” (citation omitted)); Aleks Kajstura, 13 United
States Senators Ask Census Bureau to Count Incarcerated People at Home, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.prisoners
ofthecensus.org/news/2016/09/30/13-senators/ [https://perma.cc/FPT2-NFRX]; Kenneth
Prewitt, Foreword to PATRICIA ALLARD & KIRSTEN D. LEVINGSTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, ACCURACY COUNTS: INCARCERATED PEOPLE & THE CENSUS, at i (2004).
86 Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
87 Prewitt, supra note 85, at i.
88 Id.
89 See PATRICIA ALLARD & KIRSTEN D. LEVINGSTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ACCU-
RACY COUNTS: INCARCERATED PEOPLE & THE CENSUS 1 (2004), http://www.brennancenter
.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/RV4_AccuracyCounts.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGQ2-G4FJ].
90 Letter from 13 U.S. Senators to Karen Humes, Chief, Population Division, U.S. Census
Bureau (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/letters/2016/13senators2016
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this growing opposition, the Census Bureau continues to defend its decision to count
incarcerated populations as residents of the communities where their correctional
facilities are located.91
B. State-Level Solutions to Prison-Based Gerrymandering
The most obvious, and arguably the most ideal, solution simply would be for the
Census Bureau to recognize its central role in the problem and to change the way
incarcerated populations are counted in future censuses.92 However, states are not
required to use data that is—for their purposes—known to be flawed, simply be-
cause it comes from the Census Bureau.93 Because states are not required to use this
data, they are correspondingly not absolved from action in addressing the constitu-
tional implications that arise from prison-based gerrymandering.94 In the absence of
Census Bureau action, the solution is for states themselves to address this inequity;
conveniently, the Census Bureau provides tools for just this purpose.95 Further at-
tempting to allow the states to take the lead, the Census Bureau released early counts
of inmate populations following the 2010 Census to aid the states in implementing
alternative districting plans, if a state so chose.96 As explained by the Prison Policy
Initiative, this option allows “[s]tates [to] correct the Census data by creating a spe-
cial state-level census that collects the home addresses of people in prison and then
adjusts the U.S. Census counts prior to redistricting.”97
Some states have already made the wise decision to address the issues created by
prison-based gerrymandering.98 Maryland was the first state to do so; on April 13, 2010,
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y42-VCY9].
91 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR “PERMANENT HOME OF
RECORD” ADDRESS 10–11 (2006), http://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/tabulating_pris
oners.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9SU-P9EC] (arguing that the alternative to the usual residence
rule, collecting “permanent home of record” addresses for incarcerated individuals, “presents
major operational issues for both the correctional facilities and the Census Bureau”).
92 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 81, at 1255–60; Phantom Constituents, supra note 61
(“[T]he Census Bureau should simply change its procedures now. Counting inmates where they
live would cure what has clearly become a troubling flaw in the census process.”).
93 See Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893–94 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567 U.S. 930
(2012) (upholding Maryland’s “No Representation Without Population Act,” which was enacted
to counteract the “distortional effects” of the Census Bureau’s standard counting practice).
94 See Wagner, supra note 81, at 1247–48.
95 See Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
96 See Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU DIRECTOR’S
BLOG (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do
-you-handle-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/NDP7-KTQS].
97 Solutions, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, https://
www.prisonersofthecensus.org/solutions.html [https://perma.cc/U7TG-AF6V] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017).
98 See, e.g., Maryland and New York Have Taken the Lead, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/factsheets/national/NY-MD-leading.pdf [https://perma
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then-Governor Martin O’Malley signed the “No Representation Without Population
Act”99 into law;100 the Maryland district court’s decision upholding the law was subse-
quently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.101 New York soon followed Maryland’s
lead, enacting similar legislation on August 3, 2010;102 this law has been upheld by
the New York State Supreme Court.103 Although only the Maryland and New York
laws were implemented in time for the wave of redistricting that followed the 2010
Census, two additional states, Delaware104 and California,105 have passed laws aimed
to end prison-based gerrymandering starting after the 2020 Census. New Jersey was
the most recent state to attempt to address the problem. In May 2017, the state leg-
islature passed legislation that would have “require[d] that incarcerated individuals
in State and Federal facilities in New Jersey . . . be counted at their last known com-
plete address.”106 New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, however, vetoed the bill on
July 13, 2017.107 If other states and localities do not follow these states’ leads in ad-
dressing representational inequities—instead choosing to continue to engage in the
inequities of prison-based gerrymandering—they are opening the door for liability
during the “already litigious redistricting process.”108
As Dale Ho, the current Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Vot-
ing Rights Project, has observed, refusal to engage in prison-based gerrymandering
comports not only with “basic legal rules of residence and domicile, but also with
broader principles of fairness and equality in the democratic process.”109 As Mr. Ho
predicted,110 and as we are starting to see,111 states are vulnerable to litigation on the
.cc/3TN6-B2BF] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (noting that Maryland and New York, by passing
“historic” legislation in 2010, “were the first two states to resolve the democratic inequities
caused by the Census Bureau’s method of tabulating prison populations”).
99 See No Representation Without Population Act, S.B. 400, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess.
(Md. 2010).
100 Carol Morello, Maryland Changes How Prisoners Are Counted in Census, WASH. POST
(Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/14/AR2
010041404600.html [https://perma.cc/F7MA-QXAY].
101 Fletcher v. Lamone, 567 U.S. 930 (2012).
102 Act of Aug. 11, 2010, Part XX, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 57 (McKinney) (bill number S.
6610-C, 233d Legislative Session).
103 Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at *7–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011).
104 H.B. 384, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2010).
105 Assem. B. 420, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
106 Press Release, N.J. Senate Democrats, Cunningham Bill to End Prison-Based Gerry-
mandering for Redistricting Purposes Goes to Governor (May 22, 2017).
107 Aleks Kajstura, Governor Christie Refuses to End Prison Gerrymandering in New
Jersey, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE: PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT (July 14, 2017), https:
//www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2017/07/14/nj-veto/ [https://perma.cc/Q9SY-9MPV].
108 See Ho, supra note 38, at 357.
109 Id.
110 See generally id.
111 See, e.g., Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla.
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basis of violation of the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote principle
if they continue to engage in prison-based gerrymandering.112 While the Supreme
Court’s decision in Evenwel v. Abbott upheld the use of total population as an appor-
tionment base,113 the representational theory expounded by the Court does not ex-
tend far enough to cover incarcerated populations, and consequently does not shield
states engaged in prison-based gerrymandering from constitutional challenges.114
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EVENWEL V. ABBOTT FOR LOWER COURT
CHALLENGES TO PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING
A. Evenwel v. Abbott and the Permissible Use of Total Population as an
Apportionment Base
The appellants in Evenwel v. Abbott challenged Plan S172, a Texas Senate ap-
portionment plan that created Senate districts with roughly equal total populations.115
Because their respective Senate districts had comparatively high populations of eli-
gible voters, the appellants argued that eligible voters in other Senate districts (spe-
cifically, those districts with fewer eligible voters) had substantially more voting
power than voters in appellants’ districts, thus violating the constitutional principle
of one-person, one-vote.116 As the Supreme Court noted, the appellants argued that
in order to protect “voter equality,” the proper apportionment base is voter-eligible
population, not total population.117 The Court expressly rejected this argument,
agreeing instead with a position advanced by the United States’s amicus brief that
“[e]qualizing total population across districts . . . ensures that the voters in each dis-
trict have the power to elect a representative who represents the same number of
constituents as all other representatives.”118
By holding in Evenwel that total population is a permissible apportionment base,
the Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ urging to mandate voter-eligible apportion-
ment.119 In doing so, the Court took careful pains to note that elected representatives
2016); Davidson v. City of Cranston, 188 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135
(1st Cir. 2016). Both cases are discussed in Section II.B.
112 Dale Ho also identifies a second vulnerability for states continuing to engage in prison-
based gerrymandering: minority vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Ho, supra note 38, at 385–91; see 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
113 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
114 See id.
115 Brief for Appellants at 2, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940).
116 Id. at 10.
117 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1126.
118 Id. at 1126–27 (“As history, precedent, and practice demonstrate, it is plainly permis-
sible for jurisdictions to measure equalization by the total population of state and local legislative
districts.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5, Evenwel,
136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940).
119 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
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represent their entire constituency—not just the voting population.120 For example,
the Court noted that “children, their parents, even their grandparents . . . have a stake
in a strong public-education system” and that nonvoters have an important stake “in
receiving constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits bureaucra-
cies.”121 Relying on this representational theory, the Court declined to hold that the
principle of one-person, one-vote was an absolute mandate to use eligible voters as an
apportionment base.122 Accordingly, the Court upheld Plan S172’s total population
apportionment base.123 The Court’s carefully considered reliance on this representa-
tional theory is crucial for understanding the decision’s potential impact on prison-
based gerrymandering.124 It is also important to note that this decision only answers
the question of what states may do—not what they must do. The Court expressly left
open the question of what other apportionment bases would be similarly permissible
under the Constitution.125
B. Challenges to Prison-Based Gerrymandering in the District Courts
In Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division, undertook a pains-
takingly careful analysis of the issues surrounding prison-based gerrymandering when
faced with a challenge to a redistricting plan implemented by Jefferson County, Florida
following the 2010 Census.126 Jefferson Correctional Institution (JCI) was a state pris-
on located within Jefferson County;127 under the challenged redistricting plan, JCI was
located entirely within District 3.128 The plaintiffs, residents of Districts 1, 2, and 4 and
a not-for-profit organization based in Jefferson County, challenged the plan as vio-
lating the principle of one-person, one-vote.129 The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was
that, because the Board of Commissioners chose to include the population of 1,157 in-
dividuals incarcerated at JCI in its apportionment base—and because the prison was
located entirely within one district—the districting plan “effectively weigh[ed] the votes
of the (nonprisoner) voters of that district more heavily than [the] [p]laintiffs’ votes, and
also [gave] the nonprisoners living in that district greater political influence.”130
120 Id. at 1132.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1132–33.
123 See generally id. at 1132.
124 See infra Part III.
125 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1133.
126 See 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
127 Id. at 1296.
128 See id. at 1297.
129 Plaintiffs Calvin and Nelson were both residents of District 2; Plaintiffs Parrish and
Griffin were residents of Districts 4 and 1, respectively; Plaintiff Concerned United People
was a not-for-profit organization based in Jefferson County. Id. at 1298–99.
130 Id. at 1298.
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As explained by Judge Walker’s decision in Calvin, in order for a population to
be affected by malapportionment, there must be some kind of representational nexus
between the representative and the individual.131 This is because representational in-
juries that are caused by malapportionment (including, but not limited to, “reduced
access, reduced influence, [and] a reduced portion of government services”) only
affect people who are meaningfully impacted by a representative’s actions.132 While
physical presence is typically a good proxy for this—because a representative will
usually have the ability to meaningfully impact individuals physically located within
his district—it is crucial to recognize that this representational nexus does not exist
because of a given individual’s physical presence.133 Including in the apportionment
base for a legislative body a large group of individuals who lack a meaningful rep-
resentational nexus with that given legislative body dilutes both the voting power
and the representational strength of individuals in other districts.134 Such a dilution
entirely undermines the fair and effective representation sought through the constitu-
tional principle of one-person, one-vote.135
In finding a lack of a representational nexus between the individuals incarcer-
ated in JCI and the legislative bodies created through the redistricting plan, the dis-
trict court relied on three conclusions drawn from a comprehensive review of the
record.136 The district court found that (1) the JCI confinement conditions were
“almost entirely determined by policies set at the state level and by prison officials
acting under state law”;137 (2) there was a lack of meaningful opportunity for JCI in-
mates to engage with members of the non-incarcerated public, except under stringent
conditions prescribed by prison officials;138 and (3) the District 3 “representatives”
had not made any meaningful effort to engage with the JCI population.139
In Davidson v. City of Cranston, the District Court for the District of Rhode Island,
citing heavily to Calvin, made similar findings in rejecting the City of Cranston’s
2012 Redistricting Plan.140 According to the Rhode Island district court, the inmate
population of Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI)—the Rhode Island state prison
at the center of Davidson’s redistricting challenge—did not participate in Cranston
civic life and received only minimal services from the City of Cranston.141 Because
131 Id. at 1310.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1310–11.
134 Id. at 1312.
135 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748–49 (1973).
136 Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1316.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 188 F. Supp. 3d 146, 151–52 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
141 Id. at 147–48 (observing that the Rhode Island State Police maintained an office at ACI
and handled most requests for police services at the institution). Additionally, while it conceded
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ACI was a state-run prison, the elected officials of Cranston did not enact regu-
lations or ordinances that affected ACI’s conditions; relatedly, these elected officials
neither campaigned nor “endeavor[ed] to represent their ACI constituents.”142 Ac-
cordingly, the District Court of Rhode Island held:
An apportionment base for a given legislative body cannot be
chosen so that a large number of nonvoters who also lack a mean-
ingful representational nexus with that body are packed into a
small subset of legislative districts. Doing so impermissibly di-
lutes the voting and representational strength of denizens in
other districts and violates the Equal Protection clause.143
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, finding that the dis-
trict court’s reasoning was difficult to differentiate from the “voter population” argu-
ment that the Supreme Court considered and then expressly rejected in Evenwel.144
However, a closer examination of the representational theory expounded by the
Evenwel Court, as well as a further exploration of what it means to “represent,” pro-
vides significant support to the holdings of both of the district courts in Calvin and
Davidson.145 Accordingly, reversal of the District Court of Rhode Island’s decision
in Davidson was not, as the First Circuit ultimately held, mandated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Evenwel.146
III. THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY RELIED ON BY THE EVENWEL COURT—THAT
ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR ENTIRE
CONSTITUENCY—DOES NOT EXTEND FAR ENOUGH TO
INCLUDE INCARCERATED POPULATIONS
A. What It Means to “Represent”
The right to vote encompasses more than casting a ballot.147 As Kathleen Barber
has posited, “the right to vote is the right to cast an effective vote, and implied in
that “[t]he Cranston Fire Department does provide services to the ACI,” the Court observed
that, “calls to the ACI represent only a negligible percentage of the Department’s total calls per
year.” Id. at 148.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 151 (quoting Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1315).
144 Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 145–46 (1st Cir. 2016).
145 See generally Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292; Davidson, 188 F. Supp. 3d 146.
146 See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); Davidson, 837 F.3d 135.
147 See KATHLEEN L. BARBER, A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION: PROPORTIONAL ELECTION
SYSTEMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xii (2000).
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‘effective’ is the right to representation.”148 At its most basic level, the concept of
representation connotes an individual or group speaking for or acting on behalf of
another individual or group.149 The late Justice Antonin Scalia observed that “the
word ‘representative’ connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but who
also, at a minimum, acts on behalf of the people.”150 The representative’s purpose is
to secure and protect the rights of the people.151 Essentially, a representative must act
in a responsible manner, in the interest of those she purports to represent.152 While
this basic understanding of representation is arguably well-established, in practice,
the idea of political representation remains an oft-debated topic.153 Critics—including
Supreme Court Justices themselves—have argued that the Court has been woefully
unsuccessful in effectively articulating “a single, well-defined principle of political
equality” at the base of the one-person, one-vote doctrine.154 However, as Justice
Clarence Thomas conceded in his concurrence in Evenwel, the Court has remained
faithful to the notion “that eligible voters have a right against vote dilution.”155 Fur-
thermore, at a bare minimum, representatives should at the very least view themselves
as representatives of their “represented” population: something which legislators with
correctional facilities located in their districts typically do not do.156
148 Id.
149 Representation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/representation [https://perma.cc/LU2A-W3ES] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
150 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Impartial Representation, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREP-
RESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 91, 98 (Robert
A. Goldwin ed., 1968).
152 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209–10 (1967) (further
observing that “[the representative] must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes
of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation
of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest”).
153 “[R]elations between the democratic ideal and the everyday practice of political rep-
resentation have never been well defined and remain the subject of vigorous debate among
historians, political theorists, lawyers, and citizens.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1143
n.1 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION i (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009)).
154 See Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra note 8, at 236; see also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1142
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]his Court’s jurisprudence has vacillated too
much for me to conclude that the Court’s precedents preclude States from allocating districts
based on total population . . . .”).
155 136 S. Ct. at 1142 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Hadley v. Junior
Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52–53 (1970); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964)).
156 PITKIN, supra note 152, at 209–10. The idea that an elected representative would ac-
tively seek to represent the incarcerated population in her district is, sadly, almost laughable.
See, e.g., Kate Carlton Greer, How Political Districts with Prisons Give Their Lawmakers
Outsize Influence, KOSU (Nov. 7, 2016), http://kosu.org/post/how-political-districts-prisons
-give-their-lawmakers-outsize-influence [https://perma.cc/F3YU-ZQJG] (discussing the ef-
fect of prison-based gerrymandering in McAlester, Oklahoma, and noting the ongoing joke
amongst the other councilmen that the inmates housed in the correctional facility in City
Councilman Robert Karr’s district are his “constituents”).
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In discussing the role of legislators, the Evenwel Court noted that the legislator’s
“everyday business” is “[s]erving constituents and supporting legislation that will
benefit the district and individuals and groups therein.”157 According to the Court’s
rationale, elected representatives’ constituents are comprised of more than only eligible
or registered voters, because nonvoters are similarly invested in policy debates and in
receiving constituent services.158 The Court accordingly upheld contested Plan S172’s
reliance on total population apportionment as promoting effective representation by
making sure that each representative is accountable to roughly the same number of
constituents.159 This rationale—that elected officials represent not just the voting popu-
lation, but the entire population—is in line with earlier representational theories pre-
viously advanced by courts.160 For example, in Davidson, the court stated that “[t]he
right to petition elected officials, a right not limited to voters, is also fundamental to
representative government, and is equally vulnerable to unconstitutional dilution if
an official in one district represents more people than those represented by the offi-
cial the next district over.”161 Similarly, discussing its earlier holding in Gaffney v.
Cummings,162 the Evenwel Court observed that in Gaffney, “the Court . . . recognized
that the one-person, one-vote rule is designed to facilitate ‘[f]air and effective repre-
sentation,’ and evaluated compliance with the rule based on total population alone.”163
Thus, the Evenwel holding that permits the use of total population is anchored in the
basic understanding that elected officials represent the total population.164
As previously noted, while the Evenwel holding permits the use of total pop-
ulation—thus providing one answer to the question of what states can do—it does
little in the way of providing an answer to the question of what states must do in order
to comply with the one-person, one-vote principle.165 The Supreme Court has previ-
ously recognized that an apportionment base of a population other than total population
may be appropriate in certain contexts.166 In Burns v. Richardson,167 acknowledging
157 136 S. Ct. at 1132 (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991)).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1132–33.
160 See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
161 188 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149 (D.R.I. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing Cal. Motor Transp.
Co., 404 U.S. at 510), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
162 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
163 136 S. Ct. at 1132 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (referencing the
holding in Gaffney).
164 See id.
165 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Leaving a Constitutional Ideal Still Un-
defined, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2016, 1:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/04opin
ion-analysis-leaving-a-constitutional-ideal-still-undefined/ [https://perma.cc/NJG7-HMJ9]
(“The only thing settled constitutionally now is that the states also are not required to divide up
districts by using the voting population to be assigned to each, making them equal. Should a state
do it that way, the opinion seems to say, the Court will then face that issue.” (emphasis added)).
166 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 94 (1966).
167 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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“Hawaii’s special population problems” (specifically, the substantial population of
temporary military personnel living in the state), the Supreme Court held that Hawaii
could use a registered-voter population base as its apportionment base.168 Noting its
holding in Reynolds v. Sims that “both houses of a bicameral state legislature must
be apportioned on a population basis,”169 the Court emphasized that in its discussion
in Reynolds, it “carefully left open the question what population was being referred to.
At several points, [the Court] discussed substantial equivalence in terms of voter popu-
lation or citizen population, making no distinction between the acceptability of such
a test and a test based on total population.”170 Thus, answering the question that it de-
liberately left open in Reynolds, the Court held in Burns that unless the decision to
include or exclude a particular class in an apportionment base is one that the Consti-
tution forbids, the resulting apportionment base “offends no constitutional bar.”171
Just as the Supreme Court’s discussion in Reynolds “carefully left open the ques-
tion” that it ultimately addressed in Burns,172 the Court in Evenwel carefully crafted
its holding in terms of equality of representation, noticeably leaving open the ques-
tion: representation of whom?173 Rejecting the appellants’ “selectively chosen lan-
guage” that strategically advanced their argument that the principle of one-person,
one-vote necessitated the conclusion that non-voters should not be included in the
apportionment base, the Court noted, “[f]or every sentence appellants quote from
the Court’s opinions, one could respond with a line casting the one-person, one-vote
guarantee in terms of equality of representation, not voter equality.”174 The Court
further observed that it had previously described “equal representation for equal num-
bers of people” as the “fundamental principle of representative government in this
country.”175 The Court ended its carefully constructed discussion by concluding that
“[a]dopting voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command would upset a
well-functioning approach to districting.”176 Thus, the Court fastidiously narrowed
its holding to the rejection of a mandate requiring voter-eligible apportionment.177
The Court left for another day the resolution of the question of what other popula-
tion bases may be utilized.178 Writing separately to concur in the judgment, Justice
168 Id. at 94.
169 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
170 Burns, 384 U.S. at 91 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576–79). For a discussion of this
point, see Thomas A. Berry, The New Federal Analogy: Evenwel v. Abbott and the History
of Congressional Apportionment, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 208, 217 (2016).
171 Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
172 Id. at 91 (discussing the Court’s decision in Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533).
173 See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132–33 (2016).
174 Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
175 Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560–61).
176 Id. at 1132.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1132–33. It has been suggested that in order for a particular population base to
be deemed unconstitutional, it must fail two tests: (1) “the population base must be prima
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Alito further underscored the narrowness of the holding reached by the unanimous
majority.179 Justice Alito observed that the question of whether a state may use a mea-
sure other than total population “is an important and sensitive question that we can
consider if and when we have before us a state districting plan that, unlike the cur-
rent Texas plan, uses something other than total population as the basis for equaliz-
ing the size of districts.”180
B. As Recognized by District Courts in Both Rhode Island and Florida,
Incarcerated Populations Lack a Meaningful Representational Nexus181
with the Communities Where They Are Incarcerated, and Thus Should
Not Be Included in the Total [Represented] Population Base
While the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the District Court of
Rhode Island’s holding in Davidson was incompatible with Evenwel, this Note ar-
gues that a careful examination of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Evenwel calls in-
to question the assumptions underlying that holding and ultimately leads to a different
conclusion.182 In finding that incarcerated populations located in a district should
not be included in the calculation of that district’s total population, the district courts
in both Calvin and Davidson readily acknowledged, and attempted to emulate, the
Supreme Court’s continued emphasis on the crucial importance of fair and effective
representation to the one-person, one-vote principle.183
As discussed previously,184 district courts in both Rhode Island and Florida found
that elected officials had not made any meaningful effort to engage with the indi-
viduals incarcerated within their districts.185 This is entirely unsurprising. In almost
facie unconstitutional, . . . it cannot be inferred from any principle of political equality that
could serve as a foundation for the one person, one vote rulings”; and (2) it “must not closely
approximate any prima facie constitutional population base” (that is, it must have some ac-
tual effect on redistricting as compared to the use of a population base that would be held
constitutional). Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra note 8, at 232.
179 See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1142–49 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
180 Id. at 1144.
181 As noted in Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, the term “represen-
tational nexus” was first used in a reported case by Judge Kozinski. 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292,
1310 n.18 (N.D. Fla. 2016). In Public Integrity Alliance, Inc. v. City of Tucson, Judge
Kozinski used the term to describe the relationship between an elected official and his con-
stituency. 805 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015). This Note adopts the slightly different meaning
of the term employed by Judge Walker in Calvin: a relationship between an official and an
individual “denizen” of a particular area. 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 n.18.
182 See generally Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120; Davidson v. City of Cranston, 188 F. Supp.
3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
183 See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292; Davidson, 188 F. Supp. 3d 146; see, e.g., Evenwel,
136 S. Ct. 1120; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
184 See supra Section II.B.
185 Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1325; Davidson, 837 F.3d at 140.
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every state, if an inmate has been sentenced following a felony conviction, he cannot
vote while incarcerated.186 Even if they are incarcerated for non-felonies, for the pur-
poses of voting, inmates do not gain the residence of their place of incarceration (see
discussion below) and therefore will almost certainly not be voting in their place of
incarceration.187 Most incarcerated individuals are not imprisoned in their home
districts.188 For example, although Cook County, Illinois, which includes the city of
Chicago, was listed as the committing county for just over half of the Illinois prison
population as of 2015, the vast majority of the Illinois prison population remains
incarcerated outside of Cook County.189 It is not simply the fact that inmates are
incarcerated outside of their true home districts that leads to the lack of a represen-
tational nexus between incarcerated populations and “their” representatives; the
mere fact that they are incarcerated at all is usually sufficient.190 Michelle Alexander
has written about the “civic death” that typically follows time spent in prison.191 As
a result of the label of “convicted felon,” individuals lose the right to serve on juries
and the right to vote; discrimination in housing, employment, and elsewhere becomes
legal.192 As Alexander observes, these restrictions (commonly referred to as “collat-
eral consequences”193) “amount to a form of ‘civic death’ and send the unequivocal
message that ‘they’ are no longer part of ‘us.’”194 It is axiomatic that this crystal clear
“us versus them” message is at its most pronounced when the individual is actively
(and involuntarily) locked up.
In addition to the inmates themselves, the people most likely to advocate on an
incarcerated individual’s behalf (such as family and friends) are also unlikely to be
186 Only Maine and Vermont allow individuals convicted of a felony offense to vote while
incarcerated; the other 48 states, and the District of Columbia, prohibit individuals from vot-
ing while incarcerated for a felony offense. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United
States, SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications
/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/56CE-LQYR].
187 See Wagner, supra note 81, at 1252 (noting that “in the rare cases where people in
prison can vote, they must always vote absentee at home, not in the district in which the
prison is contained”).
188 See Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE PUN-
ISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197, 197 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (discussing the fact that “while most prisoners in America
are from urban communities, most prisons are now in rural areas”).
189 See ILL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 75, 80–81
(2016), https://www.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Documents/FY2015%20Annual
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26F-4W63].
190 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 141–42 (2010).
191 Id. at 142.
192 Id. at 141–42.
193 See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IM-
PRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (exploring the pervasive impact
of the modern era of mass incarceration).
194 ALEXANDER, supra note 190, at 142.
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constituents of the district where the correctional facility is located.195 This further
differentiates incarcerated populations from other non-voting populations196 and re-
inforces the idea that in all respects that matter for representation, incarcerated pop-
ulations are not constituents of the representatives of their places of incarceration.
Unlike the voters challenging the districting plan in Evenwel, the appellants chal-
lenging the redistricting plans at issue in Calvin and Davidson are not advocating for
mandating eligible voter-based apportionment, nor are they advocating that true to-
tal population is an improper apportionment base;197 their argument is more aptly char-
acterized as an argument for a more effective means of determining the actual total
population.198 Common law and virtually all states define “residence” as the place a per-
son chooses to be without a current intention to go elsewhere.199 Prisoners do not lose
their former residency upon incarceration.200 For example, New York’s State Con-
stitution states that “no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by
reason of his or her presence or absence . . . while confined in any public prison.”201
195 See Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial Con-
sequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L.
REV. 587, 589 (2004) (observing that imprisonment tends to move people “out of large urban
centers and into rural communities”).
196 See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016) (providing as examples of
“[n]onvoters [that] have an important stake in many policy debates—children, their parents,
[and] even their grandparents”).
197 See id.; Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2016);
Davidson v. City of Cranston, 188 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st
Cir. 2016).
198 See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 9, Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135
(1st Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1692) (summarizing the argument against the redistricting plan by ex-
plaining that “[c]ounting the entire population of Rhode Island’s prison facilities in a single
City ward specifically undermines Cranston’s asserted goal of representational equality”).
199 See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (establishing that “[a] per-
son’s domicile is the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal estab-
lishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent therefrom’”
(quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954))). Notice that this understanding
of residency is in conflict with the Census Bureau’s defining of “usual residence” as “the
place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time.” Proposed 2020 Census Residence
Criteria, supra note 10. This definitional incongruity is a major reason why using the Census
data for redistricting purposes is the source of so many problems.
200 Sean Suber, Note, The Senseless Census: An Administrative Challenge to Prison-Based
Gerrymandering, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 473–75, 473 n.4 (2014) (observing that
“[i]n all states, either the state’s constitutional provisions, statutes, or common law—and in
some instances all three—support the contention that prisoners do not lose their former
residency upon incarceration”). Further supporting this notion is the obvious fact that in-
carceration is, by its very nature, involuntary. Regardless of views on the efficacy or validity
of incarceration as punishment, it would strain logic and good sense to argue that an inmate
serving a sentence in a correctional facility “chooses” to be there. See generally Mas, 489
F.2d 1396 (establishing requirements for a person’s legal domicile).
201 N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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Similarly, Vermont’s annotated statutes state that “[a] person shall not gain or lose a
residence solely by reason of presence or absence . . . while confined in a prison or cor-
rectional institution.”202
Admittedly, the Census Bureau’s continued use of the “usual residence” rule in
determining where individuals should be counted will frequently—if not usually—
result in an incarcerated individual being counted in his place of incarceration.203 How-
ever, as previously noted, states are not required to use the Census Bureau data for
purposes of redistricting.204 Indeed, the information gathered through the decennial
census is compiled for purposes other than state redistricting, and as it currently
stands, is not the best means to count total population in accordance with the one-
person, one-vote principle.205 Furthermore, specifically in response to concerns about
an individual’s “usual residence” being the correctional facility where she is invol-
untarily incarcerated, the Census Bureau has worked to provide states with resources
to ensure that their “inmate guests”—although counted as residents of their correc-
tional facilities for purposes of the Census—are not considered part of the popula-
tion when it comes to drawing new district lines.206 While the 2020 Census will still
count inmates at their “usual residence” (and subsequently, most likely at their place
of incarceration), the Census Bureau plans to offer a product that will aid states that
make the prudent decision to “move” their incarcerated population back to the incar-
cerated individuals’ pre-incarceration addresses for redistricting and other purposes.207
By rejecting the City of Cranston’s inclusion of incarcerated populations in its
redistricting numbers, the district court in Davidson was not proscribing the use of
total population, which would—as the First Circuit correctly observed—mandate
reversal as incompatible with the Supreme Court’s holding in Evenwel.208 The dis-
trict court simply held that inmates must be counted out of the “total population”
numbers because they are not, in fact, part of the total population.209 Just as the Supreme
202 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a) (2017). For a comprehensive list of similar state au-
thorities, see Suber, supra note 200, at 473 n.4.
203 Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
204 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2017); Proposed 2020 Census Residence
Criteria, supra note 10; Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567
U.S. 930 (2012).
205 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“The conclusion that States may adjust census
data during the redistricting process is also consistent with the practices of the Census Bureau
itself. According to the Census Bureau, prisoners are counted where they are incarcerated
for pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal ones.”).
206 The Census Bureau acknowledged potential problems with the impact of its “usual
residence” rule on incarcerated populations during the 2010 Census and released early counts
of prisoners. See Groves, supra note 96.
207 Proposed 2020 Census Residence Criteria, supra note 10.
208 See generally Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); Davidson v. City of Cranston,
188 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.R.I. 2016), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
209 Davidson, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 152.
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Court ultimately answered in Burns the question that it had “carefully left open” in
Reynolds,210 the question left open by the Court in Evenwel can be answered in a
challenge to a ruling similar to the First Circuit’s decision in Davidson.211 A total
population apportionment base, as approved by the Evenwel Court, refers to the total
represented population of a district—a population that definitively excludes incar-
cerated populations.212
CONCLUSION
The impact of the U.S. Census Bureau’s method for counting the location of an
inmate’s involuntary confinement as his “usual residence” increased exponentially
when incarceration rates exploded around the country in this current era of mass in-
carceration.213 Given the significant impact that the inclusion of incarcerated pop-
ulations in the total population figures has on the always-contentious redistricting
process, it is far past time for this problem to be addressed.214 Although, arguably,
the ideal solution would be for the Census Bureau to change its counting methods,
states and local districts are not powerless to address the problems arising from
prison-based gerrymandering on their own;215 correspondingly, the states and local
districts are not protected from resulting constitutional challenges if they choose to
remain complacent and allow the problems to persist. While the U.S. Supreme Court
in Evenwel v. Abbott upheld the use of total population as an apportionment base,216
the representational theory relied on by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the
total population referred to is the total represented population. Because elected of-
ficials do not represent the incarcerated populations located within their districts, these
incarcerated populations should not be included in a total population apportionment
base. Their inclusion impermissibly dilutes the voting power of other districts in a
clear violation of the constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote.
210 The question left open in Reynolds was, namely, what population base the Court was refer-
ring to when it mandated apportionment substantially “on a population basis.” Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). For additional insights, see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
211 See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120; Davidson, 837 F.3d 135.
212 See generally Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120.
213 See Ho, supra note 38, at 358 (opining that “fairness in the democratic process is a
casualty of our polices of mass incarceration”); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 190;
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 193.
214 See, e.g., Stinebrickner-Kauffman, supra note 8, at 282 (“There is no reason to think that
the political effects of the Census Bureau’s inmate enumeration method will lessen in the fore-
seeable future, and every reason to think they will increase. . . . [C]urrent trends indicate that
there is much to be said for preventative measures.”). Stinebrickner-Kauffman’s assertion,
written in 2004, has only increased in importance in the thirteen years since its publication.
215 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567 U.S. 930 (2012).
216 See 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
